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Abstract

T

he following provides an assessment of the performance of both individual
safety net programs and the cumulative impact of all safety net benefits and tax

credits on household incomes in the early years during and following the 2007-09
recession. Specifically, I examine the extent to which various benefits and tax credits
have moderated the impact of earnings losses for households in different positions
in the income distribution, with special attention to the experiences of low-income
households. In addition, I examine whether these moderating impacts differ for
households of various racial/ethnic compositions, female-headed households, and
residents of states with more and less accessible safety net programs. Overall, safety
net programs have very significantly mitigated what would otherwise have been
substantial, and in the case of lower income households, severe losses in income. This
has been especially true for many working poor and lower middle class households
who have benefited from their eligibility for a range of benefits and credits that are
conditional on employment or earnings. However, heavy reliance on employment
conditional benefits has reduced access to this income support for households with
barriers to labor force participation, such as very poor female-headed households. In
addition, across the income distribution non-white households have experienced both
disproportionately large earnings losses and less receipt of compensating benefits and
credits. Finally, the availability, accessibility, and generosity of benefits and credits
varies so substantially across states that very poor households have experienced
both the largest and the smallest declines in total household income depending on
state of residence. In closing, I stress that many of the programs that have done the
most to mitigate earnings losses were either temporary (tax credits) or exhaustible
(Unemployment Insurance, TANF) and are not structured to accommodate a
prolonged employment crisis such as that we are currently experiencing. Given the
dramatic erosion of labor force participation among low-income households and the
exhaustibility of the programs that have expanded the most since 2007, I expect the
capacity of current safety net programs to mitigate income losses to falter substantially
and potentially disastrously in coming years.
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Introduction and Summary of Findings
The prolonged period of high unemployment and
weak economic growth during and in the years
following the 2007–2009 recession constitute both
a human tragedy and a rather extreme test of the
responsiveness of safety net programs in the United
States. For decades, various scholars, researchers,
and politicians have remarked on the manner
in which the U.S. social safety net has become
increasingly frayed. The following provides an
assessment of the performance of both individual
safety net programs, such as Unemployment
Insurance and the Earned Income Tax Credit, and
the cumulative impact of all safety net benefits and
credits on household incomes in the early years
during and following the recession. Specifically,
I examine the extent to which various benefits
and tax credits have moderated the impacts of
earnings losses for households in different positions
in the income distribution, with special attention
to the experiences of low-income households.
Additionally, I examine whether these moderating
impacts differ for households of various racial/
ethnic compositions, female-headed households,
and residents of states with more and less accessible
safety net programs. Along the way, I identify
the primary programs and credits supporting
household incomes and evaluate program
responsiveness in the context of the deepest
recession since the Great Depression. Central
findings including the following:
• On average, it appears that in light of the
dramatic declines in earnings for lowincome households U.S. safety net programs
have very significantly mitigated income
losses during the first two years of the
recession.
• For lower income households (the bottom
20% of households in terms of income),
Unemployment Insurance and SNAP are
the programs that have most substantially
replaced earnings lost between 2007
and 2009. Importantly, for these same
households receipt of income by way of the
Earned Income Tax Credit has fallen and
benefits received via Temporary Assistance

for Needy Families has remained essentially
unchanged.
• Both the magnitude of earnings losses
and the extent to which benefits and
credits have moderated these losses differ
significantly across households of different
racial/ethnic compositions. In brief, poorer
non-white households have experienced
a dramatic collapse in earnings and nonwhite households, in general, have had less
of their earnings losses replaced by benefits
or credits than either white or Hispanic
households. As a consequence of both
larger earnings losses and lower receipt
of benefits and credits, middle class nonwhite households have experienced larger
reductions in total income than poor nonwhite, Hispanic, or white households.
• Despite substantial earnings losses, working
poor and middle class female-headed
households have experience a remarkable
stability of incomes over the first two years
of the recession as a result of increases
in income received via both benefits and
tax credits. In contrast, very poor femaleheaded households experienced reductions
in income from the EITC as labor force
participation declined. Additionally, total
income received by poor single mothers
from TANF actually declined, albeit slightly,
between 2007 and 2009.
• Substantial differences in the generosity
and accessibility of a small number of
programs (SSI, UI, and especially TANF)
appear to drive the significantly different
degrees to which state safety net programs
have mitigated earnings losses for very poor
households. This divergence is most striking
for households at the 10th percentile
where total income losses were roughly
7%, between 2007 and 2009, in the states
characterized by low safety net accessibility
as compared to losses of just over 1% in
states with more accessible programs.
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Falling Household Incomes and Rising
Poverty
The national poverty rate rose to 15.1 percent
in 2010 from 12.5 percent in 2007. This poverty
rate indicates that 46.2 million Americans
were below the official poverty line in 2010. This
spike in poverty is a direct result of dramatic
reductions in household earnings, an experience
that hit lower income households especially hard.
Figure 1 displays the percentage change in total
adjusted household incomes for households at
various percentiles between 2007 and 2009.1 All
of the following figures, including Figure 1, are
restricted to households in which the household
head is older than 24 and younger than 60 years of
age. I focus on these “working age” households to
remove the low household incomes that might be
experienced by the very elderly or college students
as such individuals may not be participating
(or participating only marginally) in the labor
market. Figure 1 indicates that total household
incomes have fallen more substantially for working
age households in the lower end of the income
distribution2. In just two years household incomes
fell over 5% for households at the 10th percentile
as compared with losses of less than 2% at the 70th
and 80th percentiles.

value of household incomes we are examining
here. Table 1 presents the dollar values of
household incomes that underlay the percent
change contained in Figures 1, 2, & 3 in the form of
household income for a family of three. Total annual
income for a working-age household of three at the
10th percentile fell from $20,528 to $19,385 between
2007 and 2009 while income for a family at the 80th
percentile fell from $103,611 to $102,065. Even if
income losses were proportional across households,
which they were decidedly not, the qualitative
impacts of such losses are more acute for lowerincome households.

The Impact of Social Welfare Benefits and
Tax Credits

One way of measuring the impact of various welfare
benefits and tax credits is to examine household
income in the absence of such benefits. Table 1
presents these hypothetical household income
figures and an estimate of household income with
benefits. For comparison, Table 1 also contains the
value of the actual total household income (from
all sources including benefits) taking into account
the impact of taxes and tax credits. This table
makes clear the relative contributions of earnings,
benefits, and tax credits to total household incomes
and provides a sense of how these contributions
While informative, figures displaying percent
vary across lower-income to wealthy households.
changes in household incomes obscure the actual
It should be mentioned that the intent of these
estimates is not to assert that
household incomes would
Figure 1. Percent Change in Total Adjusted Household Income:
have actually been some
2007–2009 (Householder Age 25-59)
0
specific value in the absence of
government benefits and tax
credits3 . Rather, the intent of
–1
such estimates is to illustrate,
roughly, both the magnitude
–2
of earnings losses experienced
by households and the extent
–3
to which these losses have
been buffered by safety net
programs over the course of
–4
the recession.
–5
–6
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Figure 2 captures both of
these phenomena well,
displaying the degree of
change in household income
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TABLE 1 Total Income for a Household of Three (2010 dollars; Householder Age 25–59)
Income
Without Benefits/
Credits

Income

Total Income

With Benefits

(With Benefits/
Credits)

Percentile

Year

10th

2007

$13,100

$18,958

$20,528

2008

$11,347

$17,934

$19,939

2009

$8,814

$17,099

$19,385

2010

$6,743

$16,115

2007

$29,044

$32,365

$32,460

2008

$26,861

$30,955

$31,368

2009

$24,638

$29,516

$31,292

2010

22,690

$28,169

2007

$42,567

$45,605

$42,531

2008

$39,972

$43,135

$40,774
$40,448

20th

30th

40th

50th

60th

70th

80th

90th

2009

$37,404

$41,280

2010

$35,943

$40,000

2007

$54,753

$57,296

$52,454

2008

$52,463

$54,762

$50,508

2009

$49,862

$52,904

$50,127

2010

$48,801

$51,962

2007

$67,931

$69,732

$62,588

2008

$64,915

$67,155

$60,706
$60,527

2009

$62,327

$65,794

2010

$61,440

$64,841

2007

$82,089

$83,486

$73,496

2008

$79,142

$81,123

$71,748

2009

$77,286

$79,632

$71,911

2010

$76,210

$78,386

2007

$98,507

$100,303

$86,438

2008

$95,436

$97,327

$84,624

2009

$93,714

$96,362

$84,858

2010

$93,081

$95,280

2007

$121,947

$123,254

$103,611

2008

$118,677

$120,318

$101,348

2009

$117,556

$119,876

$102,065

2010

$116,351

$118,317

2007

$164,178

$165,637

$134,520

2008

$160,579

$162,386

$131,895

2009

$158,258

$160,00

$131,275

2010

$156,314

$158,421
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Figure 2. Household Income Losses With and Without Benefits or Credits:
2007–2009 (Householder Age 25-59)
0

Percent Change 2007–2009
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Income Losses With Benefits
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–35
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between 2007 and 2009 both with and in the
absence of benefits and credits. The majority of
non-benefit/credit income for most families is
garnered through their labor market earnings,
but may be supplemented by income from child
support, alimony, gifts, loans, and so on. However,
0

50th
Percentile

60th

70th

80th

90th

for convenience, this non-benefit/credit income will
be referred to as either “market income” or simply
“earnings” in the following. Figure 3 displays change
in both household income without benefits or
credits and change in income with benefits between
2007 and 2010. The data required to account for the

Figure 3. Household Income Losses With and Without Benefits: 2007–2010 (Householder Age 25-59)
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impact of taxes and tax credits in 2010 have not yet
been released.
These two figures indicate clearly that while all
households have experienced losses in earnings
since the onset of the recession, the magnitude of
these losses as a proportion of total earnings have
been significantly larger in the lower end of the
income distribution. Households at the 10th and
20th percentiles experienced losses of 49% and
22% in market income between 2007 and 2010,
respectively, while households at the 80th and 90th
percentiles lost roughly 5% over the same period.
The receipt of both benefits and tax credits has
very significantly moderated these rather dramatic
losses in earnings for lower-income households.
Between 2007 and 2009 market income losses of
33%, 15%, and 12% percent at the 10th, 20th, and
30th percentiles translated in into total income
losses of only 5.6%, 3.6%, and 4.9%, respectively,
as a result of the receipt of benefits and credits.
Figures 4 and 5 display these impacts in actual
dollars, presenting the composition of total annual
households incomes for a household of three
at the 10th percentile and the 20th percentiles
respectively. For a household of three at the 10th
percentile estimated annual labor market earnings
fell from $13,100 in 2007 to $8,814 in 2009, a
significant loss. However, due to a compensating
expansion of income from benefits and credits total
household income only fell by $1,143 over these
same years. On average, it appears that in light of
Figure 4. Composition of Total Annual
Income for a Household of Three at the
10th Percentile (2010 dollars)
$20,000

the dramatic declines in earnings for low-income
households U.S. safety net programs have very
substantially mitigated income losses. Whether
this is true for all types of households and whether
we can expect this to continue are two important
issues that will be addressed below.

What Constitutes the Contemporary
Safety Net?
We have seen the significant impacts of benefits
and credits on total household income for lowincome households, but through what programs
are households receiving these benefits? Figure 6
displays the percentage of total income received via
benefits and tax credits by working-age households
in the bottom quintile of the income distribution
in both 2007 and 2009. In 2007, of all the income
received by households in the bottom 20% roughly
a quarter came from benefits and credits and
69% of their income was earned through wages
and salaries4. I provide 2007 proportions both for
comparison and to illustrate the composition of the
benefit/credit mix for low-income families in a peak
business cycle year (the average unemployment
rate in 2007 was 4.6%). The actual combination
of benefits or credits received by any particular
household will vary dramatically depending on the
composition and circumstances of the household.
The main goal here is to get a sense of the relative
magnitude of the contribution of various safety net
programs to the incomes of poorer households.

$33,000

Figure 5. Composition of Total Annual
Income for a Household of Three at the
20th Percentile (2010 dollars)

$31,000
$29,000

$15,000

$27,000
$25,000

$10,000

$23,000
$21,000

$5,000

$19,000
$17,000

$0

2007
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Tax Credits Benefits Earnings

$15,000
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In 2007, the program that makes the largest
contribution to low-income household incomes is
Social Security. This is presumably a situation where
an elderly individual or relative is a member of a
household with a working age head and their Social
Security benefits contribute to (or is here counted
as part of) total household income. Next, roughly
6.5% of income was received by way of the federal
tax code with nearly 90% of that income received
by way of the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC). The
third largest contribution is from SSI, comprising
4.6% of total income in the lowest quintile in 2007.
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF),
Unemployment Insurance, and Disability benefits
each comprised roughly 1% of total income. While
no doubt important to their respective recipients,
the remaining benefits and credits (Veterans,
Survivors, Workers’ Compensation, and state tax
credits) comprise a very small share of all transfers
received by the bottom 20% of households.
Figure 6 also provides the proportions of income
from various programs in 2009. While this
gives us a sense of the contribution of various
programs in 2009, Figure 6 is an imperfect guide
to understanding changes in program use and
expenditures between 2007 and 2009. As earnings
have fallen substantially the proportion of income
from benefits consequently increases even if the
amount of income received via a particular program
remained constant year-to-year. In 2009 households
in the bottom quintile received roughly a third of
their income from benefits and credits and 59%
of their income from wages and salaries. In terms
of changes in program utilization, the only firm
conclusion that we can draw from Figure 6 is that
income received from Unemployment Insurance
payments has increased dramatically. It also
appears that income from federal tax credits has
increased, although to much less of an extent. For
the remaining programs it is not possible to discern
whether the proportion of income received has
increased as a result of increased receipt of that
benefit or as a consequence of the proportion of
benefits increasing mechanically as earnings fell.

8

Figure 6. Percent of Total Income From Benefits
and Credits: Bottom 20% of Households 2007 and
2009 (Householder Age 25-59)
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In order to address this, Figure 7 presents the
percent change, between 2007 and 2009, in total
income received through various programs by
the bottom 20% of households. In this case we are
looking at the change in raw (constant) dollars to
get a sense of how much the total expenditures
received by the bottom 20% of households within
these various programs has changed since the
onset of the recession. Figure 7 does not include UI
as the total income received through this program
by the bottom quintile increased 386% between
2007 and 2009. Otherwise, we see increases only in
total income received through federal and state tax
credits, SSI, TANF, and Veterans’ benefits.

Evaluating the Performance of the U.S. Social Safety Net in the Great Recession

15

Figure 7. Percent Change in Total Value of Transfers Received via Benefits and Credits between
2007-2009: Bottom 20% of Households (Householder Age 25-59)
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Federal and State Tax Credits
As mentioned above, in 2007 nearly 90% of
the income received via federal tax credits by
households in the bottom quintile was received
through the Earned Income Tax Credit. The number
of taxpayers claiming the EITC increased from
24.6 million in 2007 to just over 27 million in 2009
as more individuals became eligible as a result
of reduced earnings (Bryan 2009; Bryan 2011).
Correspondingly, the total value of the national tax
expenditure on the EITC increased from $48.5 to
$59.2 billion over the same years. However, Figure
7 indicates that the total value of income reaching
the bottom 20% of households via this specific tax
credit has fallen by over 10%. Presumably, this is a
consequence of a significant proportion of lowerincome households losing eligibility for this credit
due to a lack of earnings. While income received
via the EITC has fallen, households in the bottom
quintile did experience an increase in income
received through federal tax credits between 2007
and 2009. This is due to the creation of a number
of temporary tax credits and cuts, primarily the
2009 Economic Recovery Payments and the Making
Work Pay credit that was made available to working
individuals in 2009 and 2010.
The fact that income received by way of the EITC
has fallen for low-income households is not
surprising given widespread job losses. This specific
development highlights a major shortcoming

inherent in the ability of earnings conditional
subsidies to reach the poorest households during
recessions. For households at the very bottom of the
income distribution the impact of the EITC is procyclical in contrast to the counter-cyclical nature of
traditional welfare programs. This is not a critique
of the EITC itself, as it constitutes a major source
of support for low-income working households
and is a highly desirable program in many regards.
Rather, the point is simply that safety net programs
which are earnings or employment conditional
will be less effective at reaching poor households in
the context of very high unemployment, especially
unemployment of significant duration such as we
are currently experiencing.
Finally, a quick note on state tax credits. While
the total value of income received through state
tax credits is rather small, Figure 7 understates
the impact for households that live in one of the 23
states that provide a state earned income tax credit.
Overall however, the amount of income received by
households in the bottom 20% by way of state tax
credit is both very minimal and has expanded only
modesty. We will return to the impact of state tax
credits below.

SSI and TANF
Increased expenditures through SSI are not
surprising, as the population of eligible disabled
individuals has undoubtedly increased as earnings
have fallen over the course of the recession.
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Figure 8. Percent of Total Income from Various
Benefits and Credits: Bottom 20% of Households,
2007 and 2009 (Householder Age 25-59)
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However, more surprising is the incredibly small
increase in the total value of TANF benefits received
by households in the bottom 20%: roughly 2.5%
between 2007 and 2009. This underlines how
radically welfare reform reshaped the nature of
AFDC a traditional counter-cyclical anti-poverty
program. This is not to say that TANF has become
completely unresponsive, the number of TANF
recipients increased 6.6% between 2007 and
2009 and another 5.3% between 2009 and 2010.
However, the relatively minor role this program
now plays as a component of the U.S. safety net
is a direct result of major changes in the late1990s and beyond including: the erosion of benefit
values, lifetime limits, and changes in eligibility
requirements (Danziger 2010). In the case of new
10

eligibility requirements, the widespread use of work
requirements further undermines the accessibility
of these benefits especially in the context of an
employment crisis.
So far we have not mentioned Supplement Nutrition
Assistance Program (SNAP) benefits, often referred
to as food stamps. A relatively under recognized
aspect of social assistance in the current downturn
is the dramatic expansion of both expenditures
on, and the number of recipients of, SNAP benefits.
The number of SNAP recipients more than doubled
between 2007 and 2010. In 2010, 40.3 million
program participants received $64.7 billion in
benefits, an average of $134 in benefits a month per
person (USDA 2011). Technically, SNAP benefits
are “in-kind” (can only be used to purchase food)
and do not constitute income per se. However, in
practice SNAP payments are income-like and free
actual income for other uses. Figure 8 presents the
same information on the composition of benefits
received by the bottom 20% of households as
Figure 6, but considers SNAP payments as a source
of income (In addition, Social Security payment are
removed from the graph, but not the estimates).
SNAP payments represent a major source of
financial support for households in the bottom
quintile with these benefits comprising 6.4% of
total household income, if considered income, in
2009. This is nearly identical to the share of income
received through all federal tax credits and larger
than the share received by the bottom 20% through
Unemployment Insurance.

Holes in the Net? Safety Net Access by
Race/Ethnicity, Family Structure, and
Location
Above it was demonstrated that transfers and
credits combined have very significantly moderated
the impact of earnings losses on total household
incomes. So far, the figures examined have
characterized the experiences of all workingage households. However, it is the case that an
individual’s race, ethnicity, family structure, and
state of residence may all impact both labor market
experiences and the accessibility of particular
benefits or credits.
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Race & Ethnicity
Beginning with differences in experiences along
racial and ethnic lines, Figure 9 displays the percent
change in total household income between 2007
and 2009 for working-age households where the
household head is either white and not Hispanic,
Hispanic regardless of race, or simply non-white5.
The percentiles in this figure indicate the position
of the household among all households of the
same racial or ethnic category; for example, the
percentiles for white households indicate the value
of household incomes for white households at
various positions in the distribution of all white
households. Consequently, the percent changes in
Figures 9-12 are changes relative to different income
levels in 2007. Table 2 provides examples of these
different income levels for a household of three
in each of the three racial/ethnic categories. As
with Figure 1 the changes captured in Figure 9 are
changes in total income from all sources.
The experience of the recession, economically
speaking, has differed substantially along racial
and ethnic lines. Among white households the
proportion of income lost between 2007 and 2009
tends to decline the higher one is in the income
distribution (with the exception of households at the

80th and 90th percentiles). Curiously, for non-white
households this pattern is largely reversed with
the size of income losses, as a proportion of total
income, increasing up to the 60th percentile. In
contrast, Hispanic households, with the exception
of households at the 10th percentile, have overall
experienced a remarkable stability in earnings
between 2007 and 2009.
In order to understand these different patterns of
income losses, let’s begin by examining households
at the 10th percentile of their respective racial or
ethic categories. Figure 9 indicates that relative to
household incomes in 2007 both white and Hispanic
households experienced a nearly identical 5.4%
decline in total income, while non-white households
experienced a 3% decline. Table 2 helps us
decompose the contributions of changes in earnings
and benefits/credits to these developments. First,
we should note that total household income for
white working-age households at the 10th percentile
was nearly twice the income received by nonwhite households in 2007: $25,878 and $13,522
respectively for a household of three. A Hispanic
household of three at the 10th percentile earned
$15,734 in 2007. The fact that total income fell by a
smaller proportion among non-white households

Figure 9. Change in Total Household Income by Race/Ethnicity: 2007-2009 (Householder Age 25-59)
White Non-Hispanic
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Percent Change 2007–2009
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TABLE 2 Total Household Income for a Family of Three by Race & Ethnicity
(2010 dollars; Householder Age 25–59)
White &
Not Hispanic

Hispanic
(Any Race)

Non-White

Percentile

Year

10th

2007

$19,154

$10,342

$3,652

2008

$17,665

$7,955

$1,499

2009

$14,103

$6,663

$88

2010

$12,000

$6,032

$0

2007

$38,308

$19,349

$18,431

2008

$35,369

$17,488

$16,239

2009

$32,613

$16,205

$13,797

2010

$30,900

$15,309

$11,284

2007

$51,780

$26,065

$29,789

2008

$49,553

$24,983

$27,381

2009

$46,188

$23,653

$25,030

2010

$45,040

$22,517

$23,500

2007

$64,495

$33,748

$41,060

2008

$61,848

$32,637

$38,273

2009

$59,375

$30,870

$36,051

2010

$58,788

$30,000

$34,639

2007

$77,394

$42,549

$53,070

2008

$74,603

$40,607

$49,463

2009

$72,335

$38,995

$47,369

2010

$72,000

$38,665

$45,033

2007

$91,219

$52,660

$66,352

2008

$88,331

$50,348

$61,864

2009

$87,258

$49,037

$59,834

2010

$86,603

$48,497

$58,870

2007

$108,690

$63,847

$82,100

2008

$105,903

$61,829

$79,062

2009

$104,340

$61,300

$75,831

2010

$103,582

$60,150

$74,000

2007

$132,482

$80,893

$103,981

2008

$128,874

$78,054

$100,290

2009

$127,377

$79,153

$97,375

2010

$126,462

$77,649

$95,460

2007

$177,978

$109,701

$140,780

2008

$175,377

$109,525

$137,836

2009

$170,014

$107,887

$137,481

2010

$168,962

$106,553

$132,456

20th

30th

40th

50th

60th

70th

80th

90th
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TABLE 2 Total Household Income for a Family of Three by Race & Ethnicity
(2010 dollars; Householder Age 25–59) continued
White &
Not Hispanic

Hispanic
(Any Race)

Non-White

Income With Benefits

White &
Not Hispanic

Hispanic
(Any Race)

Non-White

Total Income (With Benefits/Credits)

$25,539

$13,692

$12,667

$25,878

$15,734

$13,522

$24,490

$12,366

$11,850

$25,334

$14,501

$13,083

$22,595

$12,220

$11,473

$24,482

$14,888

$13,116

$21,334

$11,758

$10,288

$41,318

$20,852

$21,928

$39,269

$23,463

$23,988

$39,419

$19,625

$21,076

$37,875

$22,422

$22,733

$37,726

$19,392

$20,213

$37,495

$23,553

$22,691

$36,157

$18,590

$18,881

$54,726

$27,363

$32,515

$49,802

$29,141

$32,586

$52,423

$26,940

$31,294

$48,344

$28,662

$31,534

$50,242

$26,259

$29,458

$47,625

$29,606

$31,087

$49,198

$25,115

$28,019

$66,583

$35,747

$43,813

$59,861

$35,319

$41,377

$64,152

$34,447

$40,796

$58,302

$34,354

$38,965

$62,534

$33,495

$39,665

$57,858

$34,889

$38,870

$61,565

$32,258

$37,974

$79,161

$44,129

$54,821

$69,986

$42,366

$50,720

$76,530

$42,397

$52,113

$68,244

$40,838

$47,675

$75,434

$41,385

$50,418

$68,271

$41,317

$47,528

$74,478

$40,800

$48,990

$92,873

$54,176

$68,458

$80,727

$50,460

$61,598

$90,301

$52,152

$63,864

$79,123

$48,795

$58,119

$89,069

$52,308

$62,282

$79,180

$49,788

$57,410

$88,329

$50,349

$61,237

$109,769

$64,499

$83,844

$93,749

$59,749

$73,407

$107,009

$63,441

$80,740

$91,718

$58,678

$71,474

$106,158

$63,299

$79,330

$92,240

$59,662

$70,931

$105,175

$61,969

$76,943

$134,113

$82,089

$105,383

$111,712

$73,455

$89,722

$131,158

$80,101

$102,411

$108,679

$71,910

$87,610

$129,720

$81,092

$100,111

$109,417

$73,975

$87,546

$128,677

$79,400

$97,980

$180,088

$111,276

$141,982

$143,553

$96,522

$115,482

$176,653

$110,585

$139,902

$141,905

$96,280

$114,985

$172,526

$110,118

$140,261

$140,392

$97,068

$115,839

$171,544

$109,503

$134,544
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Figure 10. Change in White Household Income: 2007-2009 (Householder Age 25-59)

Percent Change 2007–2009
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10th

20th
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is not surprising given that these households had
significantly less income to lose.
Less expected are the dramatic differences in
changes in earnings that have occurred along
racial/ethnic lines, changes that are nearly
completely obscured by the countervailing impacts
of benefits and transfers. Market income for white
households at the 10th percentile fell 26% between
2007 and 2009 (for a family of three from $19,154 to
$14,103). Hispanic households at the same percentile
experienced a 36% reduction in earnings ($10,342
to $6,663 for a family of three). Finally, non-white
households at the 10th percentile started at a much
lower market income level in 2007 and saw those
earnings fall 97% over this two-year period. For
a non-white family of three, the value of annual
market income fell from $3,652 in 2007 to $88 in
2009; by 2010 earnings for non-white households at
the 10th percentile fell to zero. Given this shocking
collapse in earnings, it is rather incredible that we
observe such mild decreases in total incomes for
these households.
Moving beyond these extremely poor households,
Figures 10-12 characterize these impacts in percent
changes for households within these three racial/
ethnic categories at the 20th percentile and above
(The 10th percentile is omitted from these figures
due to that fact that changes at the 10th percentile
are so large that it makes it difficult to examine
14

50th
Percentile

60th

70th

80th

90th

patterns at other points in the income distribution.).
Earnings losses for both white and Hispanic
households are very similar across the income
distribution. With the sole exception of households
at the 90th percentile, it is consistently the case that
non-white households experienced significantly
larger proportional reductions in earnings than
white or Hispanic households. These larger losses
in earnings help explain the trend, noted in Figure
9, in which total income losses for non-white
households were largest around the median and
the 60th percentile. To illustrate, let us focus for
a moment on a point of extreme contrast. At the
60th percentile white households experienced
total income losses on the order of 1.9% between
2007 and 2009, while non-white households at the
same percentile experienced a 6.8% loss in total
household income. Driving these developments was
a 4.3% decline in total market income (earnings)
for white households, while earning fell more than
twice as much, 9.8%, within non-white households.
Earnings did fall more for non-white households,
but it is also clear that the impact of benefits and
transfers buffered those losses less substantially
than was the case for white households.
However, this example is something of an applesto-oranges comparison, as we are comparing
the income of a non-white household at the
60th percentile of the distribution of non-white
households with a white household at the 60th
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Figure 11. Change in Hispanic Household Income: 2007-2009 (Householder Age 25-59)

Percent Change 2007–2009
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percentile of all white households. A household
of three with a non-white household head at the
60th percentile of all working age non-white
households earned approximately $66,352 in
2007. The equivalent white household at the same
percentile within the distribution of working
age white households earned roughly $91,219 in
2007. Given these differences in earnings levels, a
more appropriate comparison is between a white
household at the 40th percentile, earning $64,495

70th

80th

90th

in 2007, and a non-white household at the 60th
percentile (earning $66,352). Figure 13 does just this
comparing the percent change in income absent
benefits or credits, income with benefits, and total
income from all sources including benefits and
credits for a white household at the 40th percentile
of earnings, a non-white household at the 60th
percentile, and a Hispanic household at the 70th
percentile. A Hispanic household of three at the
70th percentile earned $63,847 in 2007.

Figure 12. Change in Non-White Household Income: 2007-2009 (Householder Age 25–59)

Percent Change 2007–2009
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Percent Change 2007–2009

Focusing first on the comparison
Figure 13. Change in Household Income With and Without Benefits or
Credit by Race/Ethnicity (Householder Age 25–59)
between white and non-white
White Households
Non-White Households Hispanic Households
households, while earnings
at the
at the
at the
losses are similar, 7.9% and
40th Percentile
60th Percentile
70th Percentile
9.8% respectively, the impacts
0
of transfer and credits are more
substantial for white households.
–2
For example, receipt of benefits
reduced total income losses
between 2007 and 2009 by 23%
–4
in white households as compared
to 8.2% in non-white households.
A detailed examination of shifts
–6
in the shares of income received
through various benefits indicates
that this development is almost
–8
entirely due to differences in
the amount of income received
–10
through Unemployment
Insurance. The total share of
income received from UI by the
–12
middle quintile6 of non-white
Income Losses Without Benefits or Credits
households more than doubled,
increasing by 222%, between 2007
Income Losses With Benefits
and 2009. However, for white
Actual Income Losses (With Benefits and Credits)
households in an identical income
white households than for minority households.
range this share increased 370%.
While it is not possible here to disaggregate
There are many factors that are likely contributing
the specific tax deductions and credits driving
to these differences. For one, the fact that (up
this development, it is likely that the use of
until a threshold) UI benefits are proportional to
earnings conditional tax credits have contributed
earnings means that racial differences in earnings
substantially to this development. Minority
will be reflected in the size of UI benefits. Further,
unemployment rates are consistently higher than
unemployment benefits are often inaccessible
that of whites and 2009 was not an exception;
to individuals with part-time jobs, inconsistent
average unemployment rates for whites, Hispanics,
work, or unstable employment histories. For a
and African-Americans were 7.2%, 11.3%, and 13.9%
wide variety of reasons, such characteristics
respectively.
disproportionately characterize the labor market
experiences of minority workers.
Finally, we turn to the surprising finding of the
remarkable stability in the incomes of many
Continuing with our comparison in Figure 13 and
Hispanic households. Figure 13 indicates that the
turning to the impact of tax credits, we see that
size of earnings losses for Hispanic households
tax policy further reduces the extent of income
at the 70th percentile were roughly half those
losses by 45% for white households and 25% for
experienced by white households with comparable
non-white households. Compared to 2007, in 2009
earnings. Given that earnings losses were smaller,
the proportion of income lost to taxes, especially
this dramatically increased the capacity of benefits
federal taxes, has been reduced substantially for all
and credits to replace this lost income. In part, this
households. Within this middle-income quintile,
same dynamic helps explain the stability of incomes
the reduction in the tax burden has been larger for
for lower-income Hispanic households observed
16
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in Figure 9. For example, both white and Hispanic
households at their respective 20th percentiles lost
a similar proportion of market income between
2007 and 2009: 15% and 16% declines. However,
given the significant differences in income levels in
2007, the raw dollar values of these earnings losses
are substantially different. Specifically, for a white
working-age household of three a 15% decline in
a 2007 income of $38,308 is a loss of $5,695. For a
comparable Hispanic family at the 20th percentile a
16% loss on a 2007 income of $19,349 is $3,143.
In addition to income losses for Hispanic
households being smaller in raw dollars,
lower income levels increase both eligibility
for means-tested benefits and the value of the
credit received via the EITC. Figure 11 shows
clearly that in addition to a significant impact
of benefits, Hispanic households at the 20th and
30th percentiles appear to receive a significantly
larger boost from tax credits then either white or
non-white households. The contrast with white
households is simply a function of many white
households, even those near the 20th percentile,
having incomes that put them above the threshold
of eligibility for the EITC. The contrast with nonwhite households is more troubling. Despite
having similar income levels at the 20th and
30th percentiles, Hispanic households received
substantially larger benefits by way of tax credits.
While it is not possible here to disentangle the
various potential contributions of unemployment,
family size, and household composition to these
differences, it likely that the significantly higher
rates of unemployment among African-Americans
contributes substantially to this difference (by
reducing receipt of earning conditional tax credits).
Overall, in terms of total income losses, nonwhite households with middling incomes have
been hit the hardest even more than very poor
households. These households, those between the
40th and 60th percentiles in the distribution of
non-white households, experienced these losses
as the combined result of both larger proportional
losses in earnings and the receipt of less relief from
benefits and tax credits. These lower-to-middle class
minority households have found themselves both
disproportionately impacted by poor labor market

conditions and less able to access income supports
via safety-net programs than either white or
Hispanic households. In addition, regardless of race
or ethnicity, very poor households also experienced
substantial reductions in total household incomes.
However, the receipt of benefits and transfers
obscures the fact that earnings losses were
dramatically larger as a proportion of total income
for very poor non-white households. In the context
of nearly unprecedented levels of both under and
unemployment among lower income households,
it is important to underline the disproportionate
intensity of this experience among poor minority
households.

Family Structure
Single-mothers often face multiple barriers to
labor force participation and, consequently, are
more likely to reply upon benefits and transfers to
supplement their earnings. In order to examine
both the impact of the recession and benefits/
credits for these households, Figure 14 displays
the changes in income with and in the absence of
benefits and credits for female-headed households
with children. The estimated incomes for a femaleheaded household of three at various percentiles
are available in Table 3. As with the previous
figures presenting changes in income along racial/
ethnic lines, the 10th percentile is omitted due to
the fact that earnings losses at the 10th percentile
dwarf those at higher percentiles. A female-headed
household of three at the 10th percentile earned
roughly $1400 in market income in 2007; by 2009
this had fallen to about $75 for the entire year. With
benefits and credits the same household’s total
income was $8171 in 2007 and $7675 in 2009. This
constitutes a 5.9% decrease in total income, as
compared to a 95% decrease in market income.
Similarly, a household at the 20th percentile
experienced a 23% decrease in earnings, but only a
5.6% decline in total household income. Above the
20th percentile it appears that the overall impact of
benefits and credits has been to create a remarkable
degree of economic stability for female-headed
households between the 30th and 80th percentiles
with incomes remaining essentially unchanged
between 2007 and 2009.
Let’s examine the experiences of the poorest of these
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TABLE 3 Total Income for a Female-Headed Household of Three with Children
(2010 dollars; Householder Age 25–59)
Income
Without Benefits/
Credits

Income

Total Income

With Benefits

(With Benefits/
Credits)

Percentile

Year

10th

2007

$1,400

$7,297

$8,171

2008

$848

$7,245

$8,218

2009

$75

$6,992

$7,685

2010

$122

$6,041

2007

$9,212

$13,165

2008

$8,268

$12,640

$14,790

2009

$7,095

$12,362

$14,689

2010

$6,000

$11,329

2007

$15,688

$18,447

$21,507

2008

$14,964

$18,130

$21,089

2009

$13,231

$17,344

$21,350

2010

$12,350

$16,896

2007

$21,789

$24,203

$27,226

2008

$20,739

$23,815

$26,550

2009

$19,542

$22,917

$27,441

2010

$19,053

$22,413

2007

$28,120

$30,190

$32,501

2008

$26,758

$29,725

$31,829

2009

$25,852

$29,319

$32,500

2010

$25,400

$28,276

2007

$36,027

$37,915

20th

30th

40th

50th

60th

70th

80th

90th

18

$15,574

$38,317

2008

$34,819

$37,164

$37,251

2009

$33,626

$36,659

$38,264

2010

$32,840

$35,421

2007

$44,869

$46,341

$45,341

2008

$43,728

$45,896

$44,478

2009

$43,172

$46,122

$45,758

2010

$41,643

$44,301

2007

$57,371

$58,769

2008

$56,229

$58,445

$54,790

2009

$55,002

$58,152

$55,669

2010

$54,121

$56,426

2007

$77,465

$79,588

$72,290

2008

$78,421

$81,269

$73,101

2009

$77,504

$80,707

$73,903

2010

$75,000

$78,389

$55,332
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Figure 14. Change in Income for Female-Headed Households with Children: 2007–2009
(Householder Age 25-59)

Percent Change 2007–2009
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households first. Figure 15 presents the percent of
total income received from various programs and
credits by the bottom 20% of working-age femaleheaded households with children in 2007 and 2009.
Programs omitted from Figure 15 contributed less
than 1% of total income received. The first thing
to note is that total income from earnings in these
lower-income female-headed households fell from
over a third to just over a quarter of total income
in 2009. Over the same years the total proportion
of income received through benefits and transfers
grew from roughly 55% to 60%. As the majority of
income was already comprised of benefits/credits
rather small increases in the share of income
from benefits compensated heavily for decreases
in earnings, which constitute a relatively small
proportion of all income. A household at the ten
percentile may have lost the majority of its earnings,
but this impact is muted, given that earnings
comprised only 17% of all income in 2007.
Figure 15 indicates that for these female-headed
households the vast majority of benefits (and the
majority of all income) were received through
five sources: Social Security, TANF, SSI, UI, and
federal tax credits, primarily the EITC. Despite the
substantial reductions in earnings experienced

70th

80th

90th

by these households essentially the only program
for which benefits have expanded significantly is
Unemployment Insurance, which increased more
than five-fold. Income received from the EITC
fell 22% as labor force participation has declined.
However, total income from federal tax credits was
stable as a number of temporary tax credits filled
the gap. Total income from TANF actually declined
slightly between 2007 and 2009. Not to belabor the
point, but it is rather incredible that in the context
of a recession of this magnitude this program has
been so unresponsive to the economic conditions
of the program’s target population, poor women
with children. This is consistent with work that has
argued that the counter cyclical nature of “welfare”
funding was fundamentally altered as a result of the
1996 welfare reform (Bentele & Nicoli forthcoming;
Soss et al. 2011; Danzinger 2010). Multiple features
of TANF, especially lifetime limits and work
requirements, constrain the responsiveness of this
program to increased need.
Finally, focusing on sources of income alone ignores
the contribution of a program that is increasingly
critical to the economic well being of lower-income
families, SNAP. Figure 16 examines the contribution
of various benefits and transfer to the bottom 20%
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of female-headed households and is identical to
Figure 15 except that it considers SNAP benefits as
income. SNAP benefits comprised 20% of household
income in 2007 and 26% by 2009. As stated earlier
it is difficult to overemphasize how substantial a
role SNAP has come to play in supplementing the
budgets of lower-income households, especially
those of single mothers.
Looking back for a moment at Figure 14, what
about those middle-income female-headed
households that experienced such stable incomes
over the initial years of the recession? How was that
accomplished? Figure 17 presents the percentage
of income received via benefits and transfers for
female-headed households within the middle
quintile of female-headed households. For a family
of three this includes households where household
incomes fall between the 40th and 60th percentiles,
ranging from roughly $27,000 to $38,000 year.
Within these households, UI benefits have expanded
the most, more than doubling between 2007 and
2009. That said, UI benefits comprised only 2% of
total income in 2009. The largest source of support
for these households came from federal tax credits,
which comprised 12% of total income in 2009. The
total share from this source increased 36% between
2007 and 2009. Roughly half of this increase is
attributable to increases in the receipt of funds via
the EITC, presumably as more household incomes
either fell into the range of eligibility for the credit
or received a larger credit as earnings fell. Less
than 1% of all income received by these households
comes from TANF, but it is noteworthy that this
small proportion of income did increase 45%
between 2007 and 2009. Finally, we stressed the role
of SNAP for lower income households. Use of SNAP
has increased among these lower-middle class
households as well. SNAP benefits comprised 3.8%
of total household income in 2009 double the share
in 2007 (not shown).
The experiences of female-headed households
present a mixed picture in terms of the accessibility
and responsiveness of the contemporary safety net.
For working-age female-headed households with
children at the 30th percentile and above, safetynet programs and tax credits have very successfully
provided stability in household incomes during the
20

first two years of the recession. A female-headed
family of three at the 30th percentile earned
$15,688 in 2007 and $13,231 in 2009. For these
poor households and for much better off middle
and upper-middle class female-headed families, it
appears that income supports have very effectively
replaced lost earnings between 2007 and 2009. On
the other hand, the only female-headed households
for which this is not the case are extremely poor
female-headed households at or below the 20th
percentile. A female-headed household of three
at the 20th percentile in 2007 earned $9,212; a
Figure 15. Percent of Total Income from Various
Benefits and Credits: Bottom 20% of
Female-Headed Households with Children,
2007 and 2009 (Householder Age 25-59)
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household at the 10th percentile earned only $1,400.
As a result of low labor force participation and
earnings, these households were heavily reliant on
benefits and credits in both 2007 and 2009. These
benefits and credits have significantly buffered
earnings losses for these very poor households,
however these income supports did not expand
enough to completely offset substantial losses.
The primary reason for this specific divergence in
the experiences of working poor female-headed
households, versus that of very poor female-headed
households, is attributable primarily to differential
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Figure 16. Percent of Total Income from Various
Benefits and Credits: Bottom 20% of
Female-Headed Households with Children,
2007 and 2009 (Householder Age 25-59)
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Figure 17. Percent of Total Income from Various
Benefits and Credits: Middle Quintile of
Female-Headed Households with Children,
2007 and 2009 (Householder Age 25-59)

receipt of earnings conditional tax credits. A
comparison of the impact of tax credits on total
earnings losses for female-headed households
at the 30th and 20th percentile in Figure 14,
illustrates these differences clearly. For working
class and middle class female-headed households,
a combination of benefits and tax credits have
largely filled the gap created by earnings losses, in
some cases in roughly equal proportions. On the
other hand, very poor female-headed households
have, on average, experienced declining access
to employment conditional subsidies, such as the
EITC, and no increases in cash assistance via TANF.
For these households, increases in income support
since the onset of the recession have been received
largely through SNAP and UI benefits for those
who were eligible. However, these analyses do not
adequately convey the depth of poverty currently
experienced by many poor single mothers. Loprest
& Nichols (2011) estimate that one in four single
mothers below 200% of the poverty line received
both no earnings and no cash assistance (that is,
no TANF or SSI benefits) in 2009. Such households
fall below the 10th percentile in these analyses, and
their extreme levels of deprivation offer a sobering
contrast to the effectiveness of safety net programs
in stabilizing the incomes of more economically
fortunate female-headed households.
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Benefits and credits received through the federal
tax code or through federal programs such as
Social Security or SSI generally have uniform
benefits structures and eligibility requirements.
Consequently, both the impact and accessibility of
these programs for eligible individuals tend to be
relatively consistent across the country. In contrast,
a number of programs vary significantly in both
their eligibility standards and benefit amounts
at the state level. This is especially the case for
state TANF and UI programs. Further, most states
supplement the value of federal SSI benefits to
varying degrees. In addition, 23 states and D.C.
provide a state earned income tax credit. As UI and
TANF are the two safety net programs that exhibit
the strongest degree of variation in accessibility,
Figures 18 and 19 illustrate state-level variation
in UI and TANF coverage. UI coverage refers
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Figure 20. Household Income Losses by Safety-Net Accessibility in State of Residence
(Householder Age 25-59)
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Figure 21. Change in Income for 10th Percentile
Households in Less & More Accessible States:
2007-2009 (Householder Age 25-59)
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to the percentage of the unemployed who were
receiving UI payments in 2009. Nationally 63% of
the unemployed were receiving UI benefits in 2009,
but at the state level coverage ranged from the low
thirties to the mid-90s. The TANF coverage measure
provided in Figure 19 is a ratio of the number of
child TANF cases over the number of poor children
in the state. The variability in TANF coverage is
extreme, ranging from under 5% to 60%.
In order to roughly characterize state safety net
accessibility I average UI and TANF coverage rates.
Grouping states using this index, Figure 20 displays
the change in total income for households in the
20 least accessible states7 and households in the 20
most accessible states8 . Households at the median
and below in both groups of states experienced
very similar proportional losses in market incomes
between 2007 and 2009. However, despite very
similar declines in earnings the experiences
of lower-income and poor households were
dramatically different depending on the degree of
safety net accessibility in their state of residence.
This divergence is most striking for households at
the 10th percentile where total income losses were
roughly 7% in the states characterized by low safety
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Figure 22. Percent of Total Income from Various
Benefits and Credits: Bottom 20% of Household
by State Safety Net Accessibility
(Householder Age 25-59)
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EITC)
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net accessibility as compared to losses of just over
1% in state with more accessible programs. Between
the 30th and 60th percentiles income losses are
larger in less accessible states, but the differences at
some points, such as the 30th and 50th percentiles,
are minor. Overall, with the sole exception of the
90th percentile, these smaller losses in states with
more accessible safety nets are attributable to the
impacts of benefits and credits. Although it should
be noted that, at the 70th percentile and above,
the fact that total losses are smaller in states with
more accessible programs is attributable to both
smaller declines in earnings and a larger impact of
benefits and credits. Returning to the surprisingly
large difference in the magnitude of change in
household incomes for very poor households at the
10th percentile, Figure 21 displays the contribution
of benefits and credits to these divergent outcomes.
Despite slightly larger declines in earnings
experienced by poor households in more accessible
states, the generosity and accessibility of both
benefits and credits in these states compensate for
nearly all lost earnings.
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This raises the question: what programs or credits
are most responsible for these observed cross-state
differences? Figure 22 compares the contributions
of various programs and credits to total incomes
in households below the national 20th percentile
within either the 20 states with the most accessible
safety net programs or the 20 states with the least
accessible programs. Lower-income households
in states with more accessible programs received
more income from SSI, UI, TANF, and state tax
credits. In the case of SSI this is likely a result of
larger state supplements to SSI payments; the
average per recipient expenditure on SSI is higher
in more accessible states. However, it should be
stated that this is a rough comparison and some
portion of the difference between these sets of
states is attributable to differences in the size of the
population of non-elderly state residents eligible
for SSI. Otherwise, the share of income from UI
received in more accessible states was 30% larger
and the share of income from TANF was over
three times larger than that in states with less
accessible programs. Shares of income from SNAP
were essentially the same within the two sets of
states (not shown). Substantial differences in the
generosity and accessibility of a small number of
programs (SSI, UI, and especially TANF) appear to
drive the significantly different degrees to which
state safety net programs have mitigated earnings
losses for very poor households.

Summary
Overall, the primary programs that have bolstered
the incomes of poorer households in the initial years
of the recession are Unemployment Insurance, a
number of temporary federal tax cuts and credits,
and in some states (to a much lesser extent) TANF.
Additionally, considering SNAP benefits income,
these benefits have become a major source of
income support. Repeatedly, the experiences of
particular types of households has highlighted
the limits on the extent to which employment
conditional benefits, such as the EITC and in some
cases TANF, can reach very poor households in
the context of a prolonged employment crisis. This
problem is especially acute for very poor femaleheaded households and for non-white households.
Finally, it is clear that access to the support

Evaluating the Performance of the U.S. Social Safety Net in the Great Recession

provided by safety
net programs,
especially UI
and TANF, is not
uniform across
states.

Figure 23. Average Annual Hours Worked: Bottom 20% & Bottom 10% of Households:
1979-2010 (Householder Age 25-59)
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important qualifiers
in mind, looking
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back at Figures 1
& 2 it is clear that
800
while the total
income losses
600
experienced by very
poor households
400
are undoubtedly
painful, these
200
losses pale in
comparison to the
0
losses that would
have occurred
■ Recession Years ■ 20th Quintile ■ 10th Decile
in the absence
of benefits and
are not counted as unemployed in the most widely
credits. While access is uneven and benefits are
used unemployment measure. In addition, I would
often extremely meager, it remains the case that the
stress that reductions in labor force participation
combined impact of various safety net programs
have been the most severe among lower-income
have substantially reduce the volatility of household
households. Figure 23 displays the average annual
incomes during the recession. However, I also
hours worked for working-age households in the
expect the capacity of existing programs to mitigate
bottom 20% of households and the bottom 10% of
income losses to falter substantially and potentially
households (in terms of adjusted incomes) between
disastrously in coming years. My pessimism is
1979 and 2010. The average work hours among these
based on two factors: the dramatic erosion of labor
households are significantly lower than households
force participation among low-income households
at higher points in the income distribution. For
and the exhaustibility of the programs that have
comparison, one person working full-time generally
expanded the most between 2007 and 2009.
logs roughly 2,000 hours in a year. As Kenworthy

Reduced Labor Force Participation in LowerIncome Households
This first development requires some elaboration.
In addition to the unemployment rate, many
observers have urged more attention be paid to
the significant declines in the employment-topopulation ratio which has fallen to levels not
see since the early 1980s. The employment-topopulation ratio captures changes in labor force
participation that may not be reflected in the
unemployment rate, due to the manner in which
workers who have dropped out of the labor force

(2011) emphasizes, following the recessions in the
early 1980s and 1990s it took essentially the entire
business cycle for work hours for lower income
households to recover to their pre-recession
levels. In the “jobless recovery” following the 2001
recession, work hours for lower-income households
were essentially flat and then reduced further when
hit by the 2007-2009 recession.

It is hard to exaggerate how devastating this
recession has been for the employment prospects
of low-income households. In 2010 average annual
hours in the bottom 10% of working-age households

Evaluating the Performance of the U.S. Social Safety Net in the Great Recession

25

Figure 24. "Welfare" Coverage: Ratio of Number of Children Receiving TANF or
SSP/Number of Poor Children, 1998-2010
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fell to 139 hours for the entire year, while
Figure 25. Total Monthy TANF/SSP Cases,
October 2007 – June 2011
the average within the bottom 20% of
5000
households fell to 864 hours. This is a
result of both reduced working hours
4800
and a dramatic expansion of the share
of households in the bottom 10% with
4600
zero working hours all year, which
jumped from 46% to 63% between 2007
4400
and 2009. Such reductions in labor force
participation among poor households
4200
are unprecedented in recent historical
memory. Further, as of 2010 the decline
4000
in working hours continued a year after
3800
the official end of the recession. Even in
the context of traditional “V-shaped”
3600
recessions the recovery of work hours
among lower-income households is often
3400
extremely slow. As of 2010, losses in work
hours for lower-income households have
3200
not even plateaued, let alone begun to
recover. This suggests that recovery of lost
3000
earnings will be many years off for a large
segment of lower-income households.
Worse, the most recent recessions,
■ All Cases ■ Child Cases
which Paul Krugman has referred to
as “post-modern” recessions, have been
Exhaustibility of Primary Income Supports
characterized by trends of brutally slow recovery
This economic outlook is troubling in and
of both employment and work hours, especially for
of itself, however the situation looks alarming when
less educated workers. If the current recovery is
considering that the primary programs that have
anything like the recovery from the 2001 recession
compensated for earnings losses in recent years are
(and all indications so far suggest that it is) then the
ill-suited to the both the magnitude and the longemployment prospects for lower-income households
term nature of the current employment crisis. As
will be bleak for many years to come.
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we saw above, income received through the EITC
has fallen for lower-income households as they have
fallen out of the labor market. In the short-term a
number of temporary federal tax cuts have filled
the gap, especially the 2008/9 Economic Stimulus
Payments and the 2009/10 Making Work Pay Tax
Credit. However, these credits have now expired.
The payroll tax cut (which was passed in late 2010,
received over the course of 2011, and recently
extended through 2012) is helpful but provides
more assistance to those with more earnings
and, importantly, only to those who actually have
earnings.

Temporary Assistance for Needy Families

of states have shortened their time limits in 2011.
Additionally, six states reduced the value of their
TANF benefits in 2011 (Schott & Pavetti 2011). These
features and trends do not bode well for either the
accessibility and adequacy of TANF benefits in
coming years, or the poor single mothers in these
particular states.

Unemployment Insurance
In terms of compensating for lost earnings, UI has,
by far, done the most heavy lifting since the onset
of the recession. This fact alone is concerning given
that state UI systems are simply not designed to
handle an employment crisis of this magnitude.
As of early 2011, 30 states had exhausted their UI
funds and have been borrowing from the federal
government to pay UI claims (Prah 2011). In 2011,
10 states introduced new UI eligibility restrictions
and reduced benefits; another 6 states reduced the
length of benefit receipt below the long-standing
26-week period (Kahan & Wentworth 2011). Federal
extensions of UI claims from the usual 26-weeks
of benefits to 99-weeks have been critical to
maintaining income support through UI. Figure
26 displays the national UI coverage, or recipiency,
rates for UI Regular programs (the normal state 26week programs) and “all programs” which includes
federally funded UI extensions. Since mid-2010
the share of the unemployed receiving UI benefits

While total income received from TANF by
lower-income female-headed households has not
expanded in response to the recession, income
from this program remains a significant source of
income for many of these households, especially in
states with more accessible TANF programs. Figure
24 displays a measure of national TANF coverage,
the ratio of the number of child TANF or SSP9
cases over the number of poor children, between
1998 and 2010. There has been a steady decline in
TANF coverage since the 1996 reform and coverage
has remained essentially flat since the onset of
the recession. TANF has not been completely
unresponsive, cases have increased, but not at a rate
sufficient to increase the percentage of
Figure 26. Percent of Unemployed Receiving Unemployment
poor children covered as more children
Insurance, First Quarter of 2007 – Third Quarter 2011
have fallen into poverty. Figure 25
70
illustrates this increase in cases for
65
all recipients and child cases, but also
indicates that the total number of cases 60
has essentially plateaued since late55
2009. Figures for the first half of 2011
50
indicate that the national caseload has
remained stable, but poverty rates will
45
undoubtedly have continued to increase
40
in 2011.
35
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at the state-level, an important feature
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Figure 27. Actual Household Income Losses and Losses in the Absence of UI, TANF,
and Temporary Tax Credits in 2009
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has been declining. This is likely primarily due
to recipients exhausting benefits, but a portion is
also attributable to individuals joining the ranks
of the unemployed who do not qualify for UI, such
as individuals with unstable work arrangements or
individuals entering the labor market who were not
previously employed, such as graduating students.
Given the structure of UI systems, there is no
mechanism by which this program can reach
the unemployed who did not qualify for benefits
upon losing their job or those who have exhausted
their benefits. UI benefits are often inaccessible to
individuals who have lost part-time jobs, lost jobs
in a manner that disqualifies them from receipt of
benefits, or lost a job that was not held long enough
to gain eligibility for benefits. Additionally, unlike
many means-tested benefits, once exhausted
UI benefits cannot be received again until the
individual in question has found employment for
a considerable period. All of these features limit
the ability of UI systems to expand to meet the
current level of need for income support. Further,
the exhaustibility of UI benefits ensures that the
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very significant buffering of earnings losses that has
been accomplished via UI programs will continue to
erode over time.

The Years Ahead
Looking back at Figure 23 for a moment, it is
not far-fetched to expect that the employment
and earnings situation of many very low-income
households will not have recovered at all in the next
two and possibly three years, six to seven years after
the onset of the recession. Many of these families
have long since spend down their assets, if they had
any to begin with, and rely heavily on the various
income supports for which they are eligible. We
are currently in the early years of a slow rolling
crisis in which a significant fraction of American
households will either fall into, or fall deeper,
into poverty as they exhaust various benefits. In
the absence of these more exhaustible benefits,
specifically UI, TANF, and temporary tax credits,
the national poverty rate in 2009 would have been
roughly 2 percentage points higher, just over 16%.
In 2010, ignoring the role of tax credits, the poverty
rate would have been nearly 17% (as opposed to
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15.1%) in the absence of UI and TANF benefits. Of
course, these rough estimates overstate the actual
degree of poverty we might expect in coming years
as changes in who is unemployed and who is eligible
for benefits will ensure that some lower income
households will be receiving benefits at any future
date. Regardless, it is safe to say that in the absence
of a dramatic improvement in the unemployment
rate many low-income households will fall into
poverty or near poverty as their exhaustible benefits
expire.
Further, simply looking at the proportion of
households that slip under the poverty line misses
both the broad impacts of benefit expiration for
a wide swath of the population and the increased
intensity of poverty for households already below
the poverty line. Figure 27 compares the actual
change in household incomes at various percentiles
with the change that would have occurred in a
hypothetical absence of all exhaustible benefits
(again, UI, TANF, and temporary tax credits) in
2009. Total income for a family of three at the 10th
percentile would have been $17,170 as opposed to
$19,385. At the 20th percentile, incomes would
have been $29,256 as compared to $31,292. The
degree to which these programs have mitigated
income losses is substantial and the loss of these
benefits in coming years will significantly impact
household incomes. Finally, attention to the poverty
rate alone obscures the severity of the economic
conditions experienced by families below the
poverty line. Measures of the depth of poverty,

which characterize how far households fall below
the poverty line during a spell of poverty, have
been rising steadily for decades. The recession has
exacerbated this trend and in 2010 44.3% of the
poor had incomes below half of the poverty line (EPI
2011). That’s an incredible 20.5 million Americans.
To put such deprivation in perspective, a family of
three below half of the poverty line in 2010 had an
annual income of less than $8,687.
It is true that as families exhaust benefits such as UI
or TANF that they may become (or remain) eligible
for particular means-tested benefits such as SNAP,
Medicaid, or programs such as SSI if they qualify.
Overall however, the decreasing accessibility of
support in the form of direct income in combination
with increases in the proportion of benefits that
are “in-kind” presents multiple challenges for poor
and near poor families as you cannot, for example,
pay the rent or utilities with an EBT card. Further,
the shift in recent decades to heavier reliance on
employment conditional programs also creates
problems of safety net access for very poor families,
again, especially in the context of a period of
enduring high unemployment. In an odd way, the
focus on earnings conditional supports in recent
decades has made the U.S. safety net more robust
for the working poor, but has simultaneously
substantially reduced the accessibility of safety
net benefits for the very poor. The severity and
duration of the current employment crisis has
exacerbated this rather critical shortcoming of the
contemporary American safety net.
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End Notes
1. All household income figures are adjusted for household
size using an adjustment called an equivalence scale in
which total household income is divided by the square
root of household members  (Kenworthy 2004; Atkinson,
Rainwater, and Smeeding 1995). Given that households
of different sizes will have different income needs, total
income is divided by this transformation of the number
of household members. The reason for transforming the
denominator in this manner is based on the assumption
that a household of four, for example, is not expected to
need four times as much income as a household of one
(due to economies of scale). Consequently, the changes
in household incomes reported are changes in household
income per (equivalent) person. Data for these figures
is drawn from the 2008-2011 March Current Population
Survey data via the IPUMS project (King et al. 2011).
2. It is important to keep in mind that these figures are not
based on changes in the incomes of the same households
over time. Rather changes displayed are in the value of
income received by households at various fixed positions
in the overall income distribution. For example, the change
in household income at the 50th percentile provides the
percent change in the value of the median household
income between 2007 and 2009.

4. The remainder is from child support, loans, alimony, gifts
and etc.
5. For convenience I will refer to these as “non-white
households” instead of “households where the household
head is non-white”. Additionally, to reduce confusion white
non-Hispanic households will be referred to as “white
households”.
6. Households between the 40th and 60th percentile.
7. In order from least to more accessible, these 20 states were:
Texas, South Dakota, Louisiana, Oklahoma, Mississippi,
Alabama, Utah, Colorado, Virginia, Georgia, Florida,
North Dakota, South Carolina, Arizona, Kentucky, Illinois,
Missouri, North Carolina, Wyoming, and Idaho.
8. In order from less to most accessible, these 20 states were:
Indiana, Michigan, Delaware, Montana, New Mexico,
New York, Alaska, New Hampshire, Iowa, Pennsylvania,
Connecticut, Vermont, New Jersey, Wisconsin, Hawaii,
Maine, Oregon, Massachusetts, California, and
Washington.
9. SSP refers to Separate State Programs, which are TANFlike state programs which states may funds on their own
initiative.

3. It is clearly the case that in a real life absence of benefits
individual behavior would likely change. Elderly
individuals might continue working or move in with
their children in the absence of Social Security payments;
disabled individuals might attempt the same in the absence
of support; or lacking unemployment insurance a jobless
individual might take any job available, as opposed to
waiting to land a job in their field.
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